Cowboy Cosmology

[Marge_Innavera]

And, further, we wouldn't be hearing any faux pieties glorifying a "might makes right" approach to civil rights tarted up as  "the will of the people".

[Marge_Innavera]

Content removed by poster -- posted in the wrong blog. Sorry!   

[injest]

"I think what you are overlooking is the very broad powers of the people to amend the Constitution," she said.

    So then it IS an amendment.

The California State Constitution CANNOT be amended by a simple majority vote.

Therefore Proposition 8 is invalid, because it is an amendment, which cannot be accomplished by a simple majority vote.

If you're going to mince words, then at least mince them in the direction that makes it sound like you agree with your own self.   

I think people dont' need to be mincing anywhere anytime!

[Wayne]

Actually I think I got my wording wrong.

I think the rule is that they can "amend" the constitution with a simple majority vote. What they cannot do is "revise" it.

Oddly enough it makes me feel slightly better. At least they are being consistent in their ridicule.   

[Shakesthecoffecan]

Still, the river rises, and will continue to rise.

They can erect what ever impediments that can come up with, but they cannot hold back the river.

The time that they sink or swim is approaching. Till then, let us go with the flow.

  Wow, I really packed a lot of clichet sound bits in that one! 

[Marge_Innavera]

If the California Supreme Court now declare that the Constitution can be amended by a simple majority vote, and a margin  of FOUR PERCENT at that, but only when it hurts faggots and not other people, then they are pathetic cowards.

This was never the case before. But it's okay now because the minority whose rights are being taken away by an ILLEGAL process is faggots.

Now if it was somebody else's rights that were being taken away by an illegal process, then that would be, well, illegal!   

The justification I've most often heard is that unlike race and gender, homosexuality is a "choice."  Regardless of whether it is or not, that would seem to be very thin ice to be skating on: religion is a choice too.  If there's ever a serious movement to divest churches of their tax exemptions -- religion obviously having flourished for millenia without such perks -- you can bet that argument will be dropped as fast as a warm dog turd.

[Wayne]

Hey Shakes, Jess, and Miz Marge! Yeah, it's good to hear from some reassuring friends.   

Hope y'all are having a great afternoon   

[Wayne]

 

[Wayne]

You can watch the whole 3 and a half hours of last week's hearings on prop 8 here:

http://www.calchannel.com/images/sc_030509.htm

Have not watched it yet. Presumably it is unpleasant, but, there it is.   

tidbits

The Court would FIND A WAY to rule out constitutional amendment calling for death penalty for jaywalking.

At about 2 hrs 15 to 17 min, Starr quotes "As long as the people are fully aware of what they are voting on."

Many people said they supported prop 8 because otherwise their church would be required to perform same-sex weddings. So they were not fully aware of what they were voting on.

2:26: Ken Starr (yes, that Ken Starr) : prop 8 ONLY defines marriage. It does not take away all the other rights of gay people.

So if it ONLY said that gay people are not allowed to ride the blue line on the subway, that would be ok, as long as it didn't take away our right to breathe?

Apparently so. They didn't ask.

2:30 "rights are defined by the people"

So civil rights can be taken away by a simple majority vote?

2:32 the vast majority agree that marriage = mixed sex...

No, 52% agreed. That is a bare majority, not a vast majority.

2:56 what matters is what was the intent of the electorate

The intent of the electorate was to prevent their church from having to perform same-sex weddings. They were misled.

3:02 Suspect class / equal respect / equal dignity

3:09 How can you justify treating suspect class of sexual orientation different from suspect classes of gender and race?

3:18 the ruling should be that the initiative process cannot be used to take away a recognized fundamental right.

3:19 Unpleasantness.

3:24 a guarantee of inalienable rights that is subject to a simple majority vote is not inalienable at all.

[Wayne]

From the California Supreme Court's previous ruling

pg 114
Because a person’s sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.

Fer cryin' out loud, what is it about pg 101-104 There is no persuasive basis for applying to statutes that classify persons on the basis of the suspect classification of sexual orientation a standard less rigorous than that applied to statutes that classify on the basis of the suspect classifications of gender, race, or religion. Because sexual orientation, like gender, race, or religion, is a characteristic that frequently has been the basis for biased and improperly stereotypical treatment and that generally bears no relation to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute to society, it is appropriate for courts to evaluate with great care and with considerable skepticism any statute that embodies such a classification. The strict scrutiny standard therefore is applicable to statutes that impose differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.

As discussed above (ante, pp. 80-82), one of the core elements embodied in the state constitutional right to marry is the right of an individual and a couple to have their own official family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the family relationship of other couples. Even when the state affords substantive legal rights and benefits to a couple’s family relationship that are comparable to the rights and benefits afforded to other couples, the state’s assignment of a different name to the couple’s relationship poses a risk that the different name itself will have the effect of denying such couple’s relationship the equal respect and dignity to which the couple is constitutionally entitled. Plaintiffs contend that in the present context, the different nomenclature prescribed by the current California statutes properly must be understood as having just such a constitutionally suspect effect.

We agree with plaintiffs’ contention in this regard. Although in some contexts the establishment of separate institutions or structures to remedy the past denial of rights or benefits has been found to be constitutionally permissible,65 and although it may be possible to conceive of some circumstances in which assignment of the name “marriage” to one category of family relationship and of a name other than marriage to another category of family relationship would not likely be stigmatizing or raise special constitutional concerns,66 for a number of reasons we conclude that in the present context, affording same-sex couples access only to the separate institution of domestic partnership, and denying such couples access to the established institution of marriage, properly must be viewed as impinging upon the right of those couples to have their family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the family relationship of opposite-sex couples.

First, because of the long and celebrated history of the term “marriage” and the widespread understanding that this term describes a union unreservedly approved and favored by the community, there clearly is a considerable and undeniable symbolic importance to this designation. Thus, it is apparent that affording access to this designation exclusively to opposite-sex couples, while providing same-sex couples access to only a novel alternative designation, realistically must be viewed as constituting significantly unequal treatment to same-sex couples. In this regard, plaintiffs persuasively invoke by analogy the decisions of the United States Supreme Court finding inadequate a state’s creation of a separate law school for Black students rather than granting such students access to the University of Texas Law School (Sweatt v. Painter (1950) 339 U.S. 629, 634),67 and a state’s founding of a separate military program for women rather than admitting women to the Virginia Military Institute (United States v. Virginia (1996) 518 U.S. 515, 555-556). As plaintiffs maintain, these high court decisions demonstrate that even when the state grants ostensibly equal benefits to a previously excluded class through the creation of a new institution, the intangible symbolic differences that remain often are constitutionally significant.

Second, particularly in light of the historic disparagement of and discrimination against gay persons, there is a very significant risk that retaining a distinction in nomenclature with regard to this most fundamental of relationships whereby the term “marriage” is denied only to same-sex couples inevitably will cause the new parallel institution that has been made available to those couples to be viewed as of a lesser stature than marriage and, in effect, as a mark of secondclass citizenship. As the Canada Supreme Court observed in an analogous context: “One factor which may demonstrate that legislation that treats a claimant differently has the effect of demeaning the claimant’s dignity is the existence of pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability experienced by the individual or group at issue. . . . ‘ . . . It is logical to conclude that, in most cases, further differential treatment will contribute to the perpetuation or promotion of their unfair social characterization, and will have a more severe impact upon them, since they are already vulnerable.’ ” (M. v. H. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 54-55 [¶ 68].)

Third, it also is significant that although the meaning of the term “marriage” is well understood by the public generally, the status of domestic partnership is not. While it is true that this circumstance may change over time, it is difficult to deny that the unfamiliarity of the term “domestic partnership” is likely, for a considerable period of time, to pose significant difficulties and complications for same-sex couples, and perhaps most poignantly for their children, that would not be presented if, like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples were permitted access to the established and well-understood family relationship of marriage. (See generally N. J. Civil Union Review Com., First Interim Rep. (Feb. 19, 2008) pp. 6-18 <http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/1st-InterimReport-CURC.pdf> [as of May 15, 2008].)

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the distinction drawn by the current California statutes between the designation of the family relationship available to opposite-sex couples and the designation available to same-sex couples impinges upon the fundamental interest of same-sex couples in having their official family relationship accorded dignity and respect equal to that conferred upon the family relationship of opposite-sex couples." that they don't understand?!?